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Anne, a 20-year-old trainee nurse in England, became pregnant by a US serviceman who had 
returned to the States. When she visited her parents in Ireland for her annual holiday, she 
knew she was pregnant and due to give birth. On the day of the birth, she felt unwell and 
remained in bed, secretly giving birth alone that evening in her bedroom. She admitted that 
she killed her infant moments after the birth: 
 
‘[i]mmediately after the baby was born I baptized it. I did not know whether it 
was a male or a female baby. I was not sure whether it was dead or alive. I tied a 
small green ribbon around the baby’s neck tightly and then wrapped it in a kilt 
skirt and placed it in my large suitcase – a blue-grey fibre case – that was in my 
bedroom. The baby did not scream.’ 
Afterwards, she went to a stream behind her house where she washed herself and rolled the 
afterbirth in some newspaper. She returned to bed and remained there all night. When she 
got up the next morning, she collapsed on the floor, and medical attention was sought. She 
was charged with murder but at the preliminary hearing at the District Court this was 
reduced to infanticide. She was convicted of infanticide at the Circuit Criminal Court. The 
trial judge, stating that he ‘felt sorry for her’ but that he also had a ‘duty to protect the 
public’, sentenced her to six months’ imprisonment, suspended on her entering a 
recognizance to keep the peace for five years. 1 
 
This article provides a first critical study of Irish judicial approaches to sentencing women 
convicted under the Infanticide Act 1949. Through an analysis of archival material, it will be 
shown that women convicted of infanticide, a homicide offence carrying a maximum of life 
imprisonment, were given exceptionally lenient sentences, with very few of these offenders 
being imprisoned following conviction. In the wider context of harsh and restrictive attitudes 
                                                 
* Dr Karen Brennan is a lecturer in law at the University of Essex. She expresses her gratitude to Profs Sabine 
Michalowski and Lorna Fox-O’Mahony for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work.  
1Anne G (1959): National Archives of Ireland, State File Circuit Criminal Court, IC/14/129 (Co. Donegal, 21 
Jul. 1959); Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochana on Crime for the Year ended 30th September 
1959 (no publication details), Appendix D “infanticide” (no page number), available at  
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/3%201959%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017; and 
Suspensory Sentence on St. Johnston Girl, Donegal Democrat, 31 Jul., 1959, at 6. 
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to female sexuality, and particularly to unmarried mothers, the obvious question that arises 
when considering sentencing of Irish infanticide offenders, such as Anne, is why women who 
killed their babies received consistently lenient treatment at the hands of the courts. 
 
To answer this question, infanticide sentencing will first be examined against existing 
feminist literature which demonstrates the role of gender constructions in how women 
offenders are treated by the criminal justice system. The literature reveals that some women 
offenders, including those who commit violent crimes, are treated leniently by the courts, 
where they are constructed as “good” within the patriarchal normative framework; others, 
however, those who are taken to have broken patriarchal gender norms, experience harsh 
treatment, being doubly punished for breaking both the law and their gender role.2 Drawing 
on the good/bad analytical framework, it will be shown that the Irish infanticide offender 
benefited from being constructed as meeting the feminine ideal. Thus, one way of explaining 
lenient sentencing of women who killed their babies is that it reflected patriarchal 
understandings of women. 
 
However, this is only part of the answer. Relying on the concept of paternalism it will be 
shown how sentencing practice in infanticide cases also had the effect of serving patriarchal 
interests, helping to maintain patriarchal laws and cultural values which placed women in a 
grossly unequal position in Irish society, particularly with respect to their reproductive 
autonomy. It will be argued that extending “mercy” to the few who killed their babies, helped 
the state to retain control over all women and their reproductive choices.   In this regard, 
“leniency” is reconstructed as “paternalism”, something which is more pernicious because, 
whilst beneficial to the individual women who appeared before the courts, it ultimately 
served the needs of the patriarchal state. 
 
                                                 
2
 For example, see generally  Anne Worrall, Offending Women: Female Lawbreakers and the Criminal Justice 
System page (1990); Belinda Morrissey, When Women Kill: Questions of Agency and Subjectivity page (2003); 
Irene Armstrong, Women and their ‘Uncontrollable Impulses’: The Medicalisation of Women’s Crime and 
Differential Gender Sentencing, 6 Psychiatry Psychol. & L. 76 (1999); Anette Ballinger, Masculinity in the 
Dock: Legal Responses to Male Violence and Female Retaliation in England and Wales, 1900-1965, 16(4) Soc. 
Legal Stud. 459 (2007). 
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The role that sentencing plays in maintaining the patriarchal social order has already been 
highlighted by Ballinger3 who approaches this from a different perspective, relying on the 
impact of gender constructions rather than the concept of paternalism to demonstrate how 
punishment of women killers reinforces and maintains heteropatriarchy. Whilst not disputing 
the important contribution of critiques of punishment based on gender constructions, in 
particular how interpreting women offenders as “good” or “bad” can serve to detract attention 
from the wider structural context and the causes of their offending, some limitations of this 
approach will be argued, including that these arguments fail to acknowledge that the criminal 
law always individualizes crime and does not take wider social circumstances into 
consideration. Ultimately, both paternalism and gender construction reveal how punishment 
of women, particularly where this is merciful, and/or based on gender constructions, can 
support patriarchy. The question that arises then is whether compassionate treatment of the 
infanticide offender under the infanticide law was problematic, and there are theoretical, 
moral, and pragmatic issues to consider here.  
 
The Infanticide Act 1949, under which the women in this sample were sentenced, is a 
specifically gendered law, first because it applies only to women and second because it 
allows for differential treatment on the basis of a female-only experience – birth or lactation. 
My previous work on the Irish infanticide law and its implementation in the courts has 
explored the background to the infanticide reform, including the role of humanitarian 
sentiment in the enactment of this law,4 and the importance of social norms in the creation of 
this statute and the way it was subsequently implemented by the courts.5 In a previous article, 
I also explore the role of pragmatic and ideological (gendered) considerations in how women 
convicted of infanticide-related offences prior to the enactment of the 1949 law, particularly 
with regard to the use of religious institutions as an alternative to imprisonment in these 
cases.6 Whilst this earlier body of work has touched on the gendered aspect of the criminal 
justice and legislative response to women who killed their babies, it has not explored this 
issue in detail. More importantly, sentencing of women under the 1949 statute has not been 
previously explored. This article, therefore, develops my previous work by providing an 
                                                 
3
 Ballinger, supra note 2.   
4
 Karen M Brennan, ‘A Fine Mixture of Pity and Justice:’ The Criminal Justice Response to Infanticide in 
Ireland 1922-1949, 31(4) Law and History Review 793 (2013) 
5
 Karen Brennan, Social Norms and the Law in Responding to Infanticide (April 2017) (unpublished article) 
(under review at Legal Studies)  
6Karen Brennan, Punishing Infanticide in the Irish Free State, 3 (1) Irish Journal of Legal Studies 1 (2013)  
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explicitly gendered perspective on the criminal justice response to infanticide. It focuses 
particularly on the issue of sentencing, demonstrating how the criminal justice response to 
infanticide, both in terms of the how the legislative framework and sentencing practice under 
this served patriarchal interests.   
 
The infanticide law and sentencing under it is not just an example of how the law and courts 
respond to crime in a gendered way. The analysis in this article also offers broader lessons 
with regard to how the criminal law deals with the question of responsibility in cases where 
the wider social, economic, and/or political inequalities played an important part in the 
commission of the offence, and where, as a result, a compassionate criminal sanction is 
sought. In this regard, the infanticide example highlights the difficulties that can arise through 
the law’s insistence on individual responsibility and its refusal to engage with the socio-
political context of criminal offending.7 It demonstrates an instance of the law’s attempt to 
show compassion without departing from its requirement for individual responsibility. 
However, it also reveals how compassion is linked to the preservation of the problematic 
socio-political structures that contributed to the crime in the first place, and raises questions 
about the role and the ability of the criminal law and courts to address issues of social 
inequality where this is linked to the offending behavior in question.   
 
This article is broken into five sections. Section I explores the crime of infanticide in Ireland 
during the 1950s and 1960s and the role of patriarchal values, laws and structures in this 
crime. Section II presents original research data on sentencing of women convicted of 
infanticide under the Infanticide Act 1949, during the period 1950 to 1975. Section III 
critiques the approach taken to punishment women for infanticide utilizing gender 
construction theory. Section IV develops this analysis further through the concept of 
‘paternalism’. Section V concludes the article.  
  
                                                 
7
 See Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law ch. 1, 2, 11 (2d ed. 
2001). 
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I. The crime of infanticide, law reform and the role of patriarchy 
Following the English model of 1922/1938, the Irish legislature adopted a specific infanticide 
statute in 1949.8 The legislation allowed for a woman who willfully killed her infant aged 
under 12 months in circumstances which would have amounted to murder, to be tried for or 
convicted of “infanticide”, where the balance of her mind was disturbed by the effect of 
childbirth or lactation consequent on this.9 The maximum sentence was life imprisonment.10 
 
This law was enacted at a time when murder was punished by a mandatory death sentence,11 
and in the decades prior to the infanticide reform this had caused significant problems in 
cases of maternal infant-murder for it was generally thought that women who killed their 
babies should not be subject to a capital conviction.12 As a result, ad hoc practices developed 
to avoid murder convictions and sentences in cases of maternal infant-murder.13 The 
infanticide statute was enacted to formalize the ad hoc lenient response.14 Strictly speaking, 
the infanticide reform wasn’t needed in order to provide for compassionate treatment of 
women who killed their babies because for years legal practice had ensured a lenient 
                                                 
8
 The Infanticide Act, 1949, following the English/Welsh Infanticide Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. V, c. 18; and 
Infanticide Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. VI, c. 36.  
9
 Infanticide Act 1949, §1. Infanticide was defined as follows: “A woman shall be guilty of felony, namely 
infanticide if – (a) by any wilful act or omission she causes the death of her child, being a child under the age of 
12 months, and (b) the circumstances are such that, but for this section, the act or omission would have 
amounted to murder, and (c) at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason 
of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of 
lactation consequent upon the birth of the child….” (Infanticide Act, 1949, §1(3)). The reference to the “effect 
of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child” has since been replaced with a reference to a “mental 
disorder (within the meaning of the Criminal Law (insanity) Act, 2006, §22(a).  
Under section 1(1) of the 1949 statute, it was not possible to charge a woman with infanticide in the first 
instance. Instead, she would be charged with murder by the prosecuting authorities and a district justice, at the 
preliminary hearing of the murder charge at the District Court, had the authority to reduce the charge to 
infanticide and send her for trial for that offence. When the accused was forwarded on the reduced charge she 
would be tried as for manslaughter (section 1(3)), which meant that she would be tried at the Circuit Criminal 
Court, a court of lower criminal jurisdiction. If the charge was not reduced and the accused was sent for trial for 
murder to the Central Criminal Court, she would be convicted of infanticide by a jury (section 1(2)), or the 
prosecution could accept an infanticide guilty plea. For further discussion on how the Infanticide Act 1949 was 
employed by the courts in processing cases of maternal infant murder, see Brennan, supra note 5.  
10
 Infanticide Act 1949, §1(3) provided that infanticide would be punished as for manslaughter.  
11
 Capital punished was abolished for “ordinary” murders in 1964 when the death penalty was limited to 
murders involving political related killings and, murders of on-duty Garda (police) and prison officers: Criminal 
Justice Act, 1964, §1. Non-capital murder was punished by penal servitude for life: Criminal Justice Act, 1964, 
§2. Capital punishment was completely abolished in 1990: Criminal Justice Act, 1990, §1. For further detail on 
the death penalty in Ireland following independence from Britain see: David M. Doyle & Ian O’Donnell, The 
Death Penalty in Post-Independence Ireland, 33(1) J. Leg. Hit. 65 (2012). 
12
 See generally Brennan, supra note 4.  
13
 Id. at 811-18. 
14
 Id. at 832-33 and passim. 
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outcome.15 However, the infanticide law, by creating a specific rationalized mechanism for 
mercy, which differentiated this killer from others on the grounds that she had a mental 
disturbance linked to birth or breastfeeding, sought to make legal practice more efficient, by 
avoiding unnecessary murder charges/trials/convictions, and more humane, because it spared 
this offender the threat of a capital trial/conviction.16 Allowing for, and formalizing, flexible 
sentencing was a key motive for this reform, and the “mad” construct was employed to 
facilitate this.17 
 
I have argued elsewhere that it is crucial to take account of the importance of the wider social 
context and related social norms in the legal response to infanticide, both before and after the 
enactment of the 1949 law.18 In particular, it is important to acknowledge the role of the 
gendered social order in contributing to this crime.  The typical infanticide case involved an 
unmarried woman who had killed her baby at or soon after a concealed birth.19 The crime 
was inextricably linked to illegitimacy and the inequitable position of women in general and 
the unmarried mother in particular in a patriarchal society. Ireland emerged as a patriarchal 
society in the social and economic fallout of the Great Famine of the mid-nineteenth century. 
Middle-class farming interests required a patrilineal system of inheritance which meant that 
extra-marital sex and illegitimacy could not be tolerated; daughters especially were held to 
high standards of sexual purity. These values were disseminated to the remainder of society 
through the teaching of the catholic church.20 Patriarchal values and interests were 
consolidated in the state and its laws following independence from Britain in 1922, and in the 
nation-building era of the nascent Irish state, a state gender ideology developed, supported by 
the increasingly influential Irish catholic hierarchy, which cast women in a crucial symbolic 
role.21  
                                                 
15
 Id. at 811-18, 827-33. 
16
 See generally id. at 827-33. 
17
 Discussed further infra text at note 68-72.  
18
 Brennan, supra note 5.  
19
 See generally, Clíona Rattigan, ‘What else could I do?’: Single Mothers and Infanticide, Ireland 1900-1950 
ch. 1 (2012).  
20
 See generally, Tom Inglis, Truth Power and Lies: Irish Society and the Case of the Kerry Babies 133-34 
(2003); Joseph J. Lee, Women and the Church since the Famine, in Women in Irish Society: The Historical 
Dimension 37-45 (1978); Rita M. Rhodes, Women and Family in Post Famine Ireland: Status and Opportunity 
in a Patriarchal Society ch. 3 (1992). 
21
 See generally,  Maryann Gialanella Valiulis, Gender, Power and Identity in the Irish Free State, 6(4)/7(1) 
Journal of Women’s History 117 (1995); Maryann Valiulis, Neither Feminist nor Flapper: the Ecclesiastical 
Construction of the Ideal Irish Woman, in Chattel, Servant or Citizen: Women’s Status in Church, State and 
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The sexual purity of the nation, in particular that of its women, was identified as key to the 
identity and survival of the newly independent state.22 The woman’s role within this gender 
order was to be domestic and pure.23 Women were expected to be mothers, but only within 
the married family; otherwise, they were to remain as chaste unmarried sisters and daughters. 
As Earner-Byrne notes: “[i]n the Irish ‘social order’ the concept of illegitimacy extended in 
practice, if not in name, to the unmarried mother: she was an illegitimate mother. The status 
of motherhood was legitimated by marriage.”24 Unmarried mothers, already culturally 
condemned, attracted particular official attention from the state and church, and there was 
much discussion on what should be done about these problematic women.25 Although the 
idea of compulsory state imposed confinement within religious-run institutions, such as 
Magdalen laundries, was touted, and was evidently considered to provide a suitable solution, 
this was never officially endorsed via legislation allowing for compulsory confinement of 
unmarried mothers.26 Unofficially, however, the reality for women was that, if not supported 
by the father of the child or their families, they had little option but to rely on religious-run 
establishments, such as mother and baby homes, and some were sent there by their families.27 
                                                                                                                                                        
Society 168-78 (1995); Maria Luddy, Sex and the Single Girl in 1920s and 1930s Ireland, 35 The Irish Review 
79, 80-81 (2007); Louise Ryan, Gender, Identity and the Irish Press, 1922-1937: Embodying the Nation 257-59 
(2002).  
22
 See generally, id.  
23
 See both pieces by Valiulis, supra note 21.  
24
 Lindsey Earner-Byrne, Mother and Child: Maternity and Child Welfare in Dublin, 1922-1960 172 (2007)  
25
  Louise Ryan, Irish Newspaper Representations of Women, Migration and Pregnancy outside Marriage in the 
1930s, in Single Motherhood in Twentieth Century Ireland: Cultural, Historical and Social Essays 103, 105-106 
(2006); Ryan, supra note 21 at 257-60; Maria Luddy, Prostitution and Irish Society 194-97, 200-3 (2007); 
Luddy, supra note 21 at 79-91; Valiulis, supra note 21 (Neither Feminist nor Flapper). 
26
 Luddy, supra note 25 at 117-123, 201-203, 235-237; Earner-Byrne, supra note 24 at 182-90; Paul Michael 
Garrett, “Unmarried Mothers” in the Republic of Ireland, 16(6) Journal of Social Work 709 (2016); Carla 
Fischer, Gender, National and the Politics of Shame: Magdalen Laundries and the Institutionalisation of 
Feminine Transgression in Modern Ireland, 41(4) Signs 821, 825-32 (2016). 
27
 There is no access to official records on how women entered these institutions, so we do not have certainty on 
how pregnant women ended up in mother and baby homes and similar establishments, although undoubtedly 
families played an important role. The McAleese report on the state’s involvement in Magdalen asylums found 
that 10.5 per cent of women who entered these particular institutions had been left there by their families. 
Admittedly, these were not pregnant women, but the figure is indicative of family willingness to send their 
female relatives to convents. See Department of Justice, Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee to 
Establish the Facts of State Involvement with Magdalen Laundries, chapter 18 (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/2013Magdalen-
P%20IV%20Chapter%2018%20Non%20State%20Routes%20(PDF%20-%20347KB).pdf/Files/2013Magdalen-
P%20IV%20Chapter%2018%20Non%20State%20Routes%20(PDF%20-%20347KB).pdf, accessed 15 May 
2017.  
Forthcoming  - to be published in the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism  
 
Released under CC-BY-NC 
As Fischer has noted, “… the fledging Irish nation-state required the hiding of those bringing 
national shame through sexual immorality in a system of mass incarceration”.28 
 
When it is said that the Irish state was patriarchal, this is not to suggest that there was a rigid 
and coherent form of gender oppression whereby men as a group used the state as a vehicle 
for male domination such that male interests were always oppositional to those of women; 
and that male interests always prevailed. The reality is of course more nuanced than that. 
Indeed, Connell rejects the idea that the state is a vehicle for male domination of women, 
arguing that it is the state itself that is patriarchal; patriarchy is embedded in the state’s 
processes and procedures.29 In this sense, patriarchy is institutionalized in how the state 
functions, rather than residing in the hands of individual men.  One aspect of this is the state’s 
ability to regulate gender relations in other institutions, such as marriage;30 another element is 
that gender is a “major realm of state policy” with the state having far-reaching powers, 
through its law, policies and procedures to have an impact in gender politics and the concrete 
experience of individuals in this regard, such as, for example in areas of housing, childcare, 
education, taxation, healthcare.31  
 
There are many examples of how patriarchy was embedded in the Irish state, and how the 
consequences of post-independence patriarchal gender ideology had a real practical impact 
on women and their choices, particularly in the area of reproductive autonomy.  As Mullally 
has highlighted, “women’s reproductive autonomy was sacrificed to the greater good of the 
post-colonial political project, and women were defined not by their equal capacity for 
agency, but by their reproductive and sexual functions”.32 Contraception was not legally 
available, due to a variety of prohibitions under section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act 1935, which included a ban on the sale and importation of contraceptives.33 This 
                                                 
28
 Supra note 26 at 821. 
29
 See generally, R.W. Connell, The State, Gender and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal, in Power/Gender: 
Social Relations in Theory and Practice 136, 142-46, 163 (1994) 
30
 Id. at 155-57. 
31
 Id. at 159.   
32
 Siobhán Mullally, Debating Reproductive Rights in Ireland, 27 Hum. Rts. Q. 78, 83 (2005).  
33
 The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1935, §17, prohibited selling, exposing, offering, advertising or keeping 
for sale or importing or attempting to import for sale contraceptives. For discussion see Sandra McAvoy, The 
Regulation of Sexuality in the Irish Free State, 1929-1935, in Medicine, Disease and the State in Ireland, 1650-
1940 253 (1999). 
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remained in place until the 1980s.34 Abortion was, and remains, a criminal offence, legally 
available only in exceptionally limited circumstances.35 As already noted, women were 
stigmatized when they became pregnant outside of marriage and faced potential 
institutionalisation. State financial support for unmarried mothers only became available in 
the early 1970s,36 and cultural intolerance of unmarried mothers only began to shift in the 
1980s.37 The crime of infanticide was closely related to the difficulties faced by unmarried 
pregnant women – it was a crime that was inextricably linked to gender inequality and, in 
particular, the effects of patriarchal values and laws which, until the latter decades of the 
twentieth century, essentially debarred sexually active women from both preventing 
pregnancy and from being mothers outside of the married state. 
 
It was in this context that the Infanticide Act was enacted and subsequently applied. The 
infanticide law provided for lenient punishment of women who murdered their babies by 
allowing for conviction for a less serious form of homicide which carried a flexible sentence. 
The law might thus be construed as a compassionate concession to unmarried women who 
murdered their babies at birth, and, as such, something which may appear to be at odds with 
prevailing patriarchal attitudes towards unmarried mothers. However, this article will 
demonstrate how the infanticide law and sentencing practice under it were also patriarchal in 
nature. Before these issues are explored, sentencing practice in cases where women were 
convicted of infanticide will be discussed.     
                                                 
34
 Restrictions were incrementally loosened from 1979 onwards. See for example, Health (Family Planning) 
Act, 1979, § 4, 5 & 13; Health (family Planning) Amendment Act, 1985, §2; Health (Family Planning) 
Amendment Act, 1992. See generally Chrystel Hug, The Politics of Sexual Morality in Ireland 86-91 (1999).  
35
 Abortion was criminalised prior to independence under the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, §58, 59, 
24 & 25 Vict. C. 10 (Eng.). This law continued to apply in Ireland after independence from Britain in 1922. In 
1983, the Irish public voted in a referendum to insert a new provision into the Irish Constitution equating the life 
of the fetus, the “unborn”, to the life of the pregnant woman, thus curtailing any potential liberalisation of 
Ireland’s abortion law, as had occurred in England and Wales in 1967 (the Abortion Act 1967, c.87) and in the 
U.S.A in the 1970s (Roe v Wade 410 Q.A. 113 (1973)). Bunracht na hÉireann, Art 40.3.3 provides (by virtue of 
the “Eight Amendment”): “The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the 
equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its law to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend 
and vindicate that right.” As a result, abortion is only available in Ireland where there is a real and substantial 
risk to the life (but not the health) of a pregnant woman, which includes a risk of suicide: The Attorney General 
v X [1992] 1 I.R. 1. In 2013, the Irish Parliament legislated to reflect this constitutional provision, as interpreted 
by the “X case”: Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act, 2013. Abortions in cases falling outside the scope of 
the very narrow exceptions provided for under this statute are criminalized and punishable to a maximum of 14 
years’ imprisonment: Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act, 2013, §22. For further detail, see Ivana Bacik, A 
History of Abortion Law in Ireland and Prospects for Change, 20(2) M.L.J.I. 75 (2014).    
36
 Social Welfare Act 1973, §8. 
37
 Inglis, supra note 20 at 125-26, 141-43. The increased cultural acceptability of unmarried motherhood is 
evidenced by statistics on births outside of marriage, which, in 1950 accounted for only three percent of all 
births and in 2000 amounted for 32 percent of all births: see Shane Kilcommins, et. al, Crime, Punishment and 
the Search for Order in Ireland 117 (2004).  
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II. Irish Infanticide Sentencing  
 
With the enactment of the 1949 Infanticide Act, the new offence of “infanticide” effectively 
supplanted murder, manslaughter and concealment of birth, as a conviction option in cases 
where women killed their babies.38 In a sample of 38 cases where a woman was charged with 
the murder of a baby between 1950 and 2015, 92.3 per cent (36) were disposed of under the 
infanticide statute, and 86 per cent of these cases resulted in a conviction.39 Most of these 
cases involved newborn victims. These cases all took place between 1950 and 1975. Since 
then there have been very few recorded instances of infanticide and, since the 1980s, none of 
these cases have been prosecuted.40 
 
Overall, according to information in crime statistical records, 31 women have been convicted 
of infanticide since the enactment of the 1949 Act (these cases all occurred during the period 
1950-1975). In the research conducted for this study, sentencing information is available for 
29 of these cases.41 Sentencing outcomes are summarized on Table A.  
                                                 
38
 Brennan, supra note 5.  
39
 The infanticide legislation required that women first be charged with murder before they could avail of the 
infanticide option: see supra note 9. 
40
 Id.  
41
 This study focuses on those sentenced under the Infanticide Act, 1949, between 1950 and 2015. It is based on 
information available in official criminal records and newspaper articles. According to information in these 
sources, the cases in this study comprise a complete, or almost complete, sample of those sentenced under the 
infanticide statute since 1950; there are three cases in the records, 1977, 1978, 1980, involving proceedings 
against a person for the murder of an infant where the outcome is not recorded and where a sentence under the 
1949 law may have resulted. The last recorded infanticide conviction and sentence noted in the records was in 
1973. Since then the incidence of this crime has fallen (only 15 cases were recorded between 1975 and 2015), 
and very few proceedings have been taken in the few cases that have come to the attention of the authorities 
over the last four decades; for further discussion see Brennan, supra note 5.  
The primary source relied on in this study was the annual Report of the Commissioner of the Garda Síochána on 
Crime (hereafter RCGSC), covering the years 1950 to 2005. The RCGSC provides information on the number 
of reported crimes, whether proceedings were taken, and the outcome of proceedings (i.e. whether a conviction 
resulted). Between 1951 and 1975, it also included a summary of the particulars of serious crimes, including the 
murder of infants and infanticide, and further detail on the proceedings and their outcome, including the 
sentence imposed. Whilst the RCGSC provides information on sentence for 28 of the 29 cases in this sample, a 
note of caution is needed because although the main aspect of the sentence (i.e whether it was custodial, 
suspended, non-custodial) was accurately reflected in the report, it became apparent when other sources were 
consulted that the RCGSC did not always include all of the requirements that had been added to the disposal. 
The RCGSC can be can be accessed at the National Library of Ireland, or online at: 
http://www.garda.ie/controller.aspx?page=90.  
For the years 2006 to 2015 the Central Statistic Office’s criminal statistics, which provide information on the 
number of reported crimes, proceedings and outcome (but not sentence), were consulted. There were no 
infanticide convictions recorded during this period: Central Statistics Office, CJA01, Recorded Crime Offences 
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by Type of Offence and Year, available at: 
http://www.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?maintable=CJA01&PLanguage=0, accessed 23 
October 2015.  
The second key source consulted was the State Books for the Central and Circuit Criminal Courts (hereafter 
SBCCC and SBCrtCC respectively). These court records are held at the National Archives of Ireland (hereafter 
NAI) and provide an index to all criminal cases appearing for trial on indictment at either court. The record 
includes information on the outcome of the proceedings and sentence, and as the official court record is likely 
the most reliable source for sentencing information. However, unfortunately, there are significant gaps in the 
availability of these records at the NAI, particular from the 1960s onwards and at circuit court level, and so they 
could not be relied upon as the main source for sentencing information in this study. I was able to obtain a state 
book record for only 11 cases in the sample. The State Files for the Central and Circuit Criminal Courts were 
also consulted (hereafter SFCCC and SFCrtCC respectively). This record does not include information on the 
outcome of criminal proceedings or sentence, but contains witness depositions from the District Court and the 
accused’s Garda statement(s) at time of arrest, which allow for information on the circumstances of the crime to 
be pieced together. Again, there was limited access to these records, and state files were found for 15 of the 30 
cases disposed of on indictment under the 1949 law (this includes cases where the accused was acquitted). There 
is no state book or state file record for cases involving a summary disposal at the District Court; five offenders 
were sentenced at the District Court following a summary disposal.  
Finally, I also conducted a search of the Irish Newspaper archives database for national and local newspaper 
reports on infanticide cases between 1950 and 1975. There was, however, limited reporting of these cases in 
both the local and national media. For example, even where the initial district court appearing was reported 
limited information was provided on those proceedings and there was usually no follow-up report on the 
subsequent trial or sentence. 
Where possible information provided in the RCGSC was verified through an available state book or newspaper 
article. As noted there were some minor discrepancies in some cases in that the RCGSC sometimes did not 
record all the additional sentencing requirements. For example, the fact that the accused was required to reside 
with her parents for a specified period, or at a convent, or that she had to undergo medical treatment was not 
mentioned in some cases where the SBCCC/SBCrtCC or a newspaper report mentioned this additional 
requirement. There were 11 cases in total where the RCGSC was the only source of information on sentence and 
so it is possible that in some of these cases additional requirements were imposed on the offender which are not 
recorded. Nonetheless, the RCGSC does provide a sufficiently good indication of the general sentence – e.g. 
where it was custodial or non-custodial, the sentence length, whether it was suspended. 
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Table A: Summary of Sentences Imposed 
Sentence (Main requirement) Number (29) 
Custody 18 




Specific requirements attached to above:  
To keep the peace and be of good behavior 17 
Reside at convent 3 
Medical treatment 3 (2 inpatient) 
Reside with parents 2 
Return to husband 1 
 
It is evident from the above table that, despite the fact that infanticide is a mitigated form of 
murder which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, punishment was 
overwhelmingly lenient. Whilst custodial sentences were imposed in most cases (62.1 per 
cent), the vast majority of these (88.9 per cent) were suspended. Indeed, only 2 women in the 
sample spent any time in prison, in one case for 13 weeks and in the other for 3 years. Six 
women were given a probation order or a recognizance. In the “other” category one woman 
was fined; one woman was discharged without conditions; one woman was ordered to reside 
at a convent for a period of between six to 12 months; one woman was given inpatient 
                                                 
42
 In one case where the offender was disposed of at the District Court the Probation of Offenders Act, 1907, 
was applied “without conviction”. Unknown name (Co. Cavan, 1964): RCGSC for the Year ended 30th Sept. 
1964 (The Stationery Office: Dublin, Pr 8202), Appendix D “infanticide”, available at 
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/1964%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017.  
 
Forthcoming  - to be published in the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism  
 
Released under CC-BY-NC 
hospital treatment (between six to 12 months); and, finally, one was ordered to come up or 
sentence when called. Overall, the approach taken reflects the trend elsewhere in relation to 
infanticide sentencing, whereby women are rarely imprisoned for this offence.43 However, in 
this regard it is important to note that whilst the infanticide law recognized that a more lenient 
criminal justice response was needed and facilitated this, it did not generate nor mandate 
lenient inclinations. Even prior to the infanticide reform in Ireland, women who killed their 
babies at birth were generally not imprisoned.44  
 
Women given a suspended sentence or a probation order on an infanticide conviction were 
required to abide by particular conditions, the most common of which was a requirement to 
keep the peace and/or be of good behavior for a specified period (normally no more than two 
years). However, other more onerous conditions were sometimes attached, including, 
requirements which had a carceral element, such as to reside at a religious institution for a 
specified period. Based on the evidence available for the cases in this sample of infanticide 
convictions, from 1950 onwards, three women were given a period of institutional residence. 
One offender, a domestic servant who had given birth in bed one night at her parent’s home 
and killed the child at birth, undertook to enter a Good Shepard Convent for not less than six 
months but not more than 12 months, “as the nuns decide”.45 Another woman who pleaded 
guilty to infanticide on a charge of murdering her unnamed infant, undertook to reside at a 
convent for 12 months as part of a recognisance/probation order.46 Finally, one woman, who 
killed her newborn infant by sticking toilet paper into its mouth, given a suspended sentence 
at the Central Criminal Court after pleading guilty to infanticide, agreed to a short period of 
residence of less than four months at a convent.47 Prior to the enactment of the 1949 
infanticide law, almost 60 percent of women convicted of an infanticide-related offence 
                                                 
43
 For example, see Nigel Walker, Crime and Insanity in England, vol 1: The Historical Perspective 133-134 
(1968); Robyn Lansdowne, Infanticide: Psychiatrists in the Plea Bargaining Process, 16 Monash University 
Law Review 41, 59-60 (1990); Daniel Maier-Katkin & Robbin S. Ogle, Policy and Disparity: The Punishment 
of Infanticide in Britain and America, 21(2) Int. J. Comp. & Appl. Crim. Justice 305, 310 (1997). 
44
 Brennan, supra note 6.   
45
 Nellie O’B (1953): NAI, SBCCC, V14/8/19 (Jan. 1953 – Dec. 1956); RCGSC 1953 (The Stationery Office: 
Dublin, Pr 2633), p. 7, available at: 
 http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/3%201953%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017; and 
for details of the case SFCCC, ID/51/2 (Co Limerick, 26 Oct. 1953);    
46
 Margaret R (Wexford, 1950): NAI, SBCCC, V15-4-15 (Feb. 1946 – Dec. 1952) 
47
  Mary R (1964): NAI, SFCCC, ID/2/162, (Dublin, 27 May 1964); SBCCC, ID/2/146A (1962 – Garda Jul. 
1964); RCGSC 1964 (The Stationery Office: Dublin, Pr 8202), Appendix D “infanticide”, available at 
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/1964%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017. 
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between 1924 and 1949 were sent to a convent or similar institution.48 This stands in notable 
contrast to what is suggested by the records consulted in this study which show that convents 
were used in only ten per cent of cases after 1949. Possibly sentences were inaccurately 
recorded in the sources consulted and convents were used more frequently than the evidence 
in this study suggests.49 However, if it is the case that judges no longer sent women who 
killed their babies to convents as part of their sentence after the enactment of the infanticide 
law this would be a striking change in practice.  
 
Three women in the sample were given a disposal that included a requirement for 
inpatient/outpatient medical treatment.50 These offenders were all married women who had 
killed older babies. For example, one offender, a 35-year-old married woman who had 
strangled her four-month-old infant, the youngest of 12 children, was discharged on agreeing 
to enter a mental hospital and stay there for six to 12 months following a plea of guilty to 
infanticide at the Central Criminal Court. The accused’s husband had emigrated two days 
prior to the killing and it was stated that on his departure “she … went into a kind of religious 
state, praying all day before pictures and shouting and swearing”. On the night of the killing, 
the accused’s sister-in-law had come to visit, and “she and another woman were so disturbed 
that they went for the police, leaving the eldest son, aged 17 and the eldest daughter with 
their mother”. The accused placed her eldest son and daughter “in front of religious pictures, 
and while they were there, choked the baby.” When the police arrived, the baby was dead. 
The accused said, “she had been told by the Almighty to kill the child to get her husband 
back.” The state prosecutor had said at the time of arraignment that the state was satisfied that 
                                                 
48
 Brennan, supra note 6 at 12-15. 
49
 As noted above, it was not possible to verify the sentence in 11 cases in this sample: supra note 41.   
50
 Christina McC (1955): NAI, SBCCC, V14/8/19 (Jan. 1953 – Dec. 1956); available at: RCGSC 1955 (The 
Stationery Office: Dublin, Pr 3782), p. 6, available at 
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/3%201955%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017. 
Bernadette J (1966): NAI, SFCCC, IC/17/58 (Co. Donegal, 25 Jan. 1966); Sentence on Mother is Suspended, 
Irish Independent, 4 Mar., 1966, at 8; RCGSC 1966 (The Stationery Office: Dublin, Pr 9381), Appendix D 
“murder of infants aged one year and under”, available at 
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/1966%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017. Eileen C 
(1971): State Accepts Guilty Plea to Infanticide, Irish Examiner, 17 Jul., 1971, at 12; Sentencing on Mother, 
Irish Independent, 17 Jul., 1971, p 22; RCGSC 1971 (The Stationery Office: Dublin, Prl 2642), p. 26, available 
at 
 http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/3%201971%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017.  
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the accused should not be tried for murder because it was clear that she was “not sane” at the 
time of the killing. 51  
 
The limited use of medical disposals may appear surprising, particularly given that the 
partially excusing rationale of the infanticide offence is that the woman had, at the time of the 
killing, a disturbance in the balance of the mind caused by the effects of childbirth or 
lactation. However, as I have previously argued, the medical mitigation framework contained 
in the infanticide law was based on a lay, not a medical, understanding of mental disturbance, 
and was not supposed to require a diagnosed mental illness.52 The way the rationale was 
interpreted by the courts further demonstrates that a specific mental illness was not required, 
particularly in cases involving killings which took place at an unassisted birth where a mental 
disturbance was often presumed due to the circumstances in which birth took place.53 
Sentencing practice, which reveals limited use of medical disposals, and only in cases 
involving older (legitimate) infants, further reinforces this point.  
 
Very short terms of imprisonment were imposed, with 66.7 per cent of the sample being 
given a term of 12 months or less. Three women were given three years’ custody; two women 
were given 2 years; and one woman was given 18 months. However, as already noted, most 
of these were suspended. Sentencing remarks from judges are not available in the records 
consulted54 and it is difficult to determine why some women were given longer custodial 
terms of over twelve months. One possible aggravating factor may have been the age of the 
victim, and, tied in with this, the fact that the killing was less typical of the classic infanticide 
case because it had not taken place in the context of childbirth. One woman, who had been 
given a three-year suspended sentence, had killed her 11-month-old child; another woman, 
who had also killed an infant near the maximum age limit to which the infanticide legislation 
                                                 
51
 Christina Mc C, id. Mother Pleads Guilty to Killing Baby, Irish Times, 1 Mar. 1955. The facts reported in the 
newspaper account indicate that the infanticide law was not applied strictly in this case. There was nothing to 
indicate a mental disturbance caused by childbirth. Rather, it seems the offender had a serious diagnosable 
mental disorder that was unconnected with childbirth, and could have relied on the insanity defence. However, 
given that insanity required a mandatory sentence of indefinite detention, the infanticide law offered a preferable 
outcome.   
52
 See generally Karen Brennan, ‘Traditions of English Liberal Thought:’ A History of the Enactment of an 
Infanticide Law in Ireland, 50 Irish Jurist 100, 123-33 (2013). 
53
 Brennan, supra note 5.   
54
 Some newspaper reports on some cases did make reference to the judge’s comments at sentence, but there 
were very few cases where this is available. 
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applied, was given a two-year suspended sentence; in another case, where the offender was 
given an 18-month suspended term, the victim was twelve days old.55 Notably, the offenders 
in each of these cases were married, though in the latter case she was separated from her 
husband. These women also had other children. Another woman who was given a suspended 
term of over one year was a thirty-one-year-old widow who killed her child at birth;56 and 
another woman, given six concurrent terms of three-year penal servitude, was a married 
woman who had killed six newborn infants to conceal an extra marital affair.57 Overall, of the 
six women given custody of over one year, only one appears to fit the stereotypical profile of 
the infanticide offender, namely the (young) unmarried woman who concealed her pregnancy 
and killed the infant at birth. In that case, the Attorney General had consented to a summary 
trial on the accused indicating a plea of guilty at the district court. The accused, a 21-year-old 
shop assistant, had given birth at home; the body of the infant was found “with certain 
injuries” in her room.58 Given the circumstances, the three-year suspended term imposed by 
the district justice in this case was somewhat unusual.  
 
Overall the evidence shows that women convicted of infanticide in Ireland between 1950 and 
1975 were given exceptionally compassionate sentencing disposals. Sentencing in all cases 
was lenient (in the context of the seriousness of the crime at hand), but the evidence does 
show some difference in approach depending on the age of the victim and marital status of 
the offender. Those who benefited most from lenient sentences were unmarried women who 
killed their babies at a concealed birth. Women who killed older babies tended to not only 
receive longer suspended prison terms, but to also be given medical requirements, including 
in-patient treatment. However, overall, but particularly in cases involving newborn victims, it 
is evident that infanticide offenders were not viewed as serious or dangerous criminals, and, 
                                                 
55
 Annie M (1953): NAI, SFCCC, V15/14/45 (Co Carlow, 26 Jan. 1953); SBCCC V14/8/19 (Jan 1953 – Dec 
1956); RCGSC 1952 (The Stationery Office: Dublin, Pr 2276), p. 6-7, available at  
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/3%201952%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017; 
Bernadette J, supra note 50; Eileen C, supra note 50.  
56
 Lena M (1957): NAI, SBCCC IC/17/86 (1957-1961); RCGSC 1957 (The Stationery Office: Dublin, Pr 4735) 
p.  7, available at: 
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/3%201957%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017.  
57
  Mary S (1954): NAI, SFCCC, V15/14/47 (Co Kildare, 1 Feb. 1954); SBCCC, V14/8/19 (Jan. 1953 – Dec. 
1956); RCGSC 1953 (The Stationery Office: Dublin, Pr 2633), p. 7, available at: 
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/3%201953%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017. 
58
 Unknown name (Kerry, 1966): RCGSC 1966 (The Stationery Office: Dublin, Pr 9381), Appendix D 
“infanticide”, available at 
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/1966%20Commissioners%20Report.pdf, accessed 9 May 2017. 
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contrary to what the language of the 1949 Act may suggest, were generally not considered to 
suffer from a mental illness that required medical intervention.   
 
In the wider social and legal context of the time, the legislative and criminal justice response 
to infanticide is somewhat of a curiosity. Sexually active women had difficulty preventing 
pregnancy because contraception was not legally available; they could not end a pregnancy 
because abortion was not legally available; and if they gave birth outside of marriage they 
could expect no state support in terms of helping them to be mothers, and, indeed, faced 
widespread cultural stigmatization. Yet, the legislature and legal system proved consistently 
willing to effectively allow women who wilfully and with malice aforethought59 killed their 
newborn illegitimate babies to escape with a suspended prison sentence, or, at worst, a short 
term of residence at a religious or medical institution. This raises the obvious question: why 
were those with political and legal power willing to effectively let those few women who 
killed their newborn babies away with murder, whilst refusing to give all women any 
measure of autonomy over their fertility? This question is addressed in the following sections, 
first with reference to gender construction theory in the context of punishing women, and, 
second, through the concept of paternalism. Both approaches serve to explain lenient 
sentencing of women who killed their babies as reflecting and reinforcing patriarchal norms, 
values and structures.  
 
III. Gender and Sentencing: Gender constructions of women who kill and the harsh/lenient 
debate 
Literature on women offenders highlights the role of gender constructions based on 
patriarchal norms of womanhood in sentencing practice. Within wider social discourse it is 
said that women are viewed through the lens of a good/bad dichotomy. The “good” woman 
construct reflects idealized patriarchal gender expectations which hold women to be passive, 
nurturing, self-sacrificing, weak, vulnerable, and irrational, being particularly susceptible to 
mental instability due to their biological functions. If a women offender can be constructed 
within legal discourse as meeting the feminine ideal she may, notwithstanding the seriousness 
of her crime and her apparent breach of gender norms by committing a criminal offence in 
                                                 
59
 The infanticide statute specifically requires that the woman committed a “wilful act or omission” and that the 
requirements for murder, which include malice aforethought, were established; see Infanticide Act 1949, §1(3).   
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the first place, be rehabilitated back into normative femininity. This can lead to lenient 
sentences. The other side of this, however, is that those women who cannot be recuperated 
into the feminine ideal are treated more harshly under the law.60  Worrall, for example, has 
argued that women offenders are constructed as either “non-criminal” (so essentially ”good”) 
or “non-women” (“bad”).61 She identifies a “gender contract” whereby women criminals are 
given the chance to “neutralize the effects of [their] law-breaking by implicitly entering into a 
contract where [they] permit [their lives] to be represented primarily in terms of its domestic, 
sexual and pathological dimensions.” The gender contract “minimizes punitive 
consequences”.62 Similarly, Morrissey has identified strategies which serve to either cast the 
offender as a victim, reflecting patriarchal norms about the “good” woman, or which 
demonize her, rendering her non-human/non-woman.63 Other constructions identified by 
writers which reflect idealized (and non-idealized) norms of womanhood, are the mad, sad, 
and bad classifications.64  
 
In cases involving homicidal women, such constructions play a particularly important role.  
Because women rarely commit violent offences, the female killer is unusual. This, in 
conjunction with widely held gender norms which view violence as inimical to femininity, 
means that the murderess must be explained to alleviate the angst caused by her conduct and 
the threat her violence poses to the patriarchal social order.65 Constructions of women who 
kill are therefore said to both explain and neutralize her violence. This is achieved by either 
recuperating her back into the feminine ideal, for example by casting her as a victim of 
                                                 
60
 For some of the literature on how women (and particularly those who kill their children) are constructed in the 
criminal justice system, reflecting wider gender stereotypes, see generally Worrall, supra note 2 at ch. 3; Susan 
S.M. Edwards, Women on Trial: A Study of the Female Suspect, Defendant and Offender in Criminal Law and 
the Criminal Justice System chs 7 & 8, esp 177-82, 183-86, 213 (1984); Hilary Allen, Justice Unbalanced 
(1987); Morrissey, supra note 2 at 3-7, 21-29 and passim; Armstrong, supra note 2; Ania Wilczynski, Mad or 
Bad? Child Killers Gender and the Courts, 37 Brit. J. Criminol. 419, 425-26 (1997); Siobhan Weare, “The 
Mad”, “The Bad”, “The Victim”: Gendered Constructions of Women Who Kill within the Criminal Justice 
System, 2 Laws 337 (2013); Siobhan Weare, Bad, Mad, or Sad?: Legal Language, Narratives, and Identity 
Constructions of Women who Kill their Children in England and Wales,  Int. J. Semiotics Law 22 (2016); 
Heather Leigh Stangle, Murderous Madonna: Femininity, Violence, and the Myth of Postpartum Mental 
Disorder in Cases of Maternal Infanticide and Filicide,  50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 699 (2008-2009) 
61
 Worrall, supra note 2 at 31.  
62
 Id.  
63
 Supra note 2 at 24-25 and passim. 
64
 Weare, supra note 60 (both articles). Specifically, on how women filicide offenders are medicalized, see 
Wilczynski, supra note 60 at 425. 
65
 Morrissey, supra note 2 at 2, 166, 170; Weare, supra note 60, 337-38 (Gendered Constructions of Women 
Who Kill).  
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circumstance or as mentally unstable, or, alternatively, by demonizing her and thus rendering 
her as “non-woman”. Both strategies serve to deny her agency and in so doing neutralize the 
threat posed by her violent act.66  
 
At first glance the infanticide offender had not only committed a serious criminal offence, but 
she had also grossly offended the patriarchal version of idealized femininity: by becoming 
pregnant outside of marriage she breached the mandate of feminine virtue and by killing the 
baby she breached norms of motherhood, although arguably, being an unmarried woman, she 
may not have been viewed as a “mother” anyway.67 However, infanticide as a crime is 
constructed in such a way that it falls on the good side of the dichotomized view of 
femininity. The infanticide law itself explains the crime on the basis of a mental disturbance 
caused by the effects of childbirth or lactation.68 Scholars frequently point to infanticide 
statutes as a prime example of the medicalization of female violence, and, in particular, as 
requiring diagnosis of a postnatal mental illness such as postpartum depression or 
psychosis.69 However, as noted whilst the language does suggest a requirement for diagnosis 
of a mental disorder linked to childbirth or lactation, both the history of infanticide laws and 
how they have been applied by the courts demonstrate that the mental disturbance 
requirement encapsulates a lay, not a medical, understanding of this crime.70 Although this 
did embody lay patriarchal norms, it did not require diagnosis of a specific mental illness 
(such as postpartum depression) and it did take account of the circumstances of the crime.71 
In other words, whilst the law does represent infanticide as an irrational act, linking it to the 
idea of biologically produced mental disturbance, it was not meant to embody a true 
pathologization of the offender, and was intended to, and did, operate in such a way as to 
recognize social mitigation.72 Nonetheless, on the face of it at least, the infanticide law 
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 Morrissey, supra note 2 at 28, 165, and passim; Weare, supra note 60 (both articles).  
67
 See supra text at note 24.  
68
 Supra note 9.  
69
 For examples of such critiques, see Edwards, supra note 60 at 79-100; Weare, supra note 60 at 343-45 
(Gendered Constructions of Women Who Kill). 
70
  For the history behind these laws, see Tony Ward, The Sad Subject of Infanticide: Law, Medicine and Child 
Murder 1860-1938, 8 Soc. and Legal Stud. 163, 166-70, 174-75 (1999); Kirsten J Kramar & WD Watson, The 
Insanities of Reproduction: Medico-Legal Knowledge and the Development of an Infanticide Law, 15 Soc. and 
Legal Stud. 237, 240-50 (2006); Brennan, supra note 50 at 123-33. For how infanticide laws have been liberally 
applied in the courts, see Ronald D. Mackay, The Consequences of Killing Very Young Children, Crim. L. R. 21, 
29 (1993); Allison Morris & Ania Wilczynski, Rocking the Cradle: Mothers who Kill their Children in Moving 
Targets: Women, Murder and Representation 198, 207-10 (1993); Brennan, supra note 5. 
71
 Brennan, supra note 5.   
72
 Id.   
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constructs the offender as “mad”, thus allowing her to be rehabilitated back into normative 
femininity.    
 
Moreover, there are other reasons why women who committed infanticide in this study could 
be recuperated back into the feminine ideal, and this links with the interpretation of female 
killers as being “sad”, as victims of circumstance. Indeed, it is more accurate to say that how 
women who killed their babies, particularly their newborn babies, were understood involved 
a blend of the mad/sad constructions of female criminality. Most of the women in the sample 
in this study had killed an illegitimate baby at or soon after a secret birth. If her concealment 
and the killing could be construed as being motivated, in the wider social context of the time, 
by a desire to conceal her shame, and preserve her respectability, then, according to 
prevailing norms, she behaved as a “good” woman would in her situation. Indeed, the act of 
infanticide was, from that perspective, arguably a manifestation of appropriate femininity.73 
This interpretation could be bolstered if she could be considered faultless in her fall from 
grace, particularly if she could be viewed as the victim of callous male sexuality. This is 
evident in the way Irish infanticide offenders were understood. For example, in one document 
relating to the 1949 infanticide reform, where a number of mitigating factors in these cases 
were outlined, it was noted that the circumstance that most affected the ordinary person in 
their judgement of these cases was the fact the father of the child, who was “so often more 
guilty than the woman herself”, “got away scot free”, while the woman had to bear “all the 
trouble and all the shame”.74  
 
The characterization of the Irish infanticide offender as embodying a mix of the mad/sad 
construction of female offenders, particularly her victimhood vis-à-vis the man who 
impregnated her, is best encapsulated in a 1941 memorandum written by a female probation 
officer on the treatment of infanticide offenders by the courts which outlines the profile of 
those appearing at the Central Criminal Court on charges relating to the death of their 
infants.75 In relation to the cause of the “downfall” of these offenders, the author noted that in 
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 Kirsten Johnson Kramar, Unwilling Mothers, Unwanted Babies: Infanticide in Canada 7 (2005).  
74
 Archives of Archbishop of Dublin, The McQuaid Papers, AB8/B/XVIII/10: memo entitled “Proposed 
Infanticide Legislation,” authored by Monsignor Dargan, dated 24 Feb., 1949, para 4.  
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 EM Carroll, Memorandum re: Women and Girls who Come Before the Central Criminal Court on Serious 
Criminal Charges and Other Matters, 7 Jul., 1941, p 1, in Report of the Interdepartmental Committee to 
Establish the Facts of State Involvement with the Magdalen Laundries (Department of Justice, 2013), Appendix 
5, available at: http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/MagdalenRpt2013. Accessed 15 November 2014. 
Forthcoming  - to be published in the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism  
 
Released under CC-BY-NC 
the case of “young girls” it was due to “ignorance which left them an easy prey to the snares 
of the first unscrupulous man who cared to take advantage of them”; with older women, they 
had “very often [been] led astray by the promise of marriage”.76 It was noted that in many of 
these cases the offender might not realize that she was pregnant for some time and then 
discovering her situation “becomes bewildered, even desperate”. Particularly in the case of 
domestic servants, being afraid to risk “instant dismissal” from her post should her pregnancy 
become known, the woman keeps silent and continues as normal until the time of birth, and 
“[t]hen in the frenzy of a moment and still trying to cover her shame, she kills her child”.77  
 
The perception of the role of men in the above is particularly interesting in that there was a 
willingness to acknowledge that men had played a part in the crime at least to the extent that 
they had contributed to the situation that lead to the woman committing it. However, it was 
individual men – reckless, selfish, manipulative men who took advantage of vulnerable 
women and then abandoned them to their fate - who were responsible, not the dominant 
gender order that enabled this double standard of sexuality. As noted, patriarchy does not 
always operate for the benefit of all men as against all women; it does not involve total 
domination of women as a category by men as a category.78 In this regard, Ballinger 
highlights the role of gender constructions of normative masculinity as another element (in 
addition to that of gender constructions of female killers) in explaining punishment of women 
who kill their abusive husbands:  the offender met gender norms of appropriate femininity 
because she could be constructed as a “victim”, whilst the deceased, her violent husband who 
had displayed “excessive masculinity”, did not conform to masculine norms. How both 
offender and victim were constructed affected the outcome in the case, leading to lenient 
treatment for the offender.79 Men who took advantage of “innocent” women by having sex 
with them outside of marriage without giving consideration to or evading the consequences 
of their sexual licentiousness were not ideal men either. They had shirked their responsibility 
to be husbands and providers within the patriarchal family.80 These men could therefore be 
blamed for contributing to the situation, and although they were not held criminally 
responsible, their failure to fulfil their role in the patriarchal social order did allow for a 
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sympathetic understanding of infanticidal women. In both cases the focus was on individual 
responsibility, moral in the case of the men, and criminal in the case of the women, rather 
than the role of wider patriarchal values and structures.81  
 
If the offender demonstrated remorse this may have also facilitated her accommodation 
within the good woman stereotype. At least 71 per cent of the infanticide convictions in this 
sample had involved a guilty plea. One of the more interesting cases examined in this study 
highlights the importance of gender constructions, including with regard to experiencing 
remorse, in how women convicted of infanticide were sentenced. The case involved a 
married woman, Mary S, who killed six newborn infants conceived in the context of an extra-
marital relationship. Mary’s husband had emigrated to England, and each time she became 
pregnant by her lover she hid her pregnancy from the outside world and killed the infant at 
birth. She confessed to her crimes whilst being treated for a mental breakdown soon after the 
birth and death of her last-born infant. Her mental illness appears to have been linked to her 
intense remorse over her crimes.82 She was given the most severe sentence in this sample: 
three years’ penal servitude on each count to run concurrent; this was not suspended.83 The 
comparative severity of the sentence imposed might indicate that she was punished not only 
for the killing of an infant, but also because of her involvement in an extra-marital affair, i.e. 
because she broke gender norms with regard to “wifely” behaviour and so was doubly 
punished. However, a three-year term, though severe in the context of the other cases in this 
sample, was not unduly harsh given the fact that she killed six infants.  
 
Indeed, a newspaper report on the case indicates that she was not perceived to have fallen so 
far from the feminine ideal that she was beyond sympathy. At the Central Criminal Court, 
Murnaghan J in his sentencing remarks stated: “You have pleaded guilty to six terrible 
offences but I am not going to make things any more difficult for you, because I believe you 
now see the awful thing you have done, and I feel you regret it”. Her victimhood is also 
highlighted by one of the investigating Garda officers who stated that her lover had “gained 
more or less complete control over [her]”. Another factor which may have influenced the 
sentencing decision was that her husband, who had been living in England for years, said he 
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would take her back and be good to her while he was living.84 Scholars have noted that the 
courts may rely on social control mechanisms such as the family when punishing women, 
which can lead them to forego formal penal methods,85 and this is evident in some other cases 
in the sample where offenders were required to reside with their parents, or, in one case, 
return to her estranged husband, as part of the sentencing disposal.86  In summary, despite the 
apparent breach of feminine norms, Mary S could still be accommodated within stereotypical 
notions of womanhood: she could be re-socialized into the patriarchal family unit; she was 
viewed as a victim of male control; she was evidently remorseful of her crimes; and she 
experienced a severe mental illness.  
 
Overall, rather than being viewed as a serious or violent criminal or as someone who had 
committed a rational act in response to intolerable social circumstances, the infanticide 
offender was understood to be a “young girl” or an “unfortunate woman” who deserved pity 
not punishment. Her crime was constructed as not being truly criminal.87 She was the 
beneficiary of being constructed as mad/sad and, therefore, as meeting norms of appropriate 
femininity. In this regard, sentencing of this offender reflected and embodied patriarchal 
norms and values.   
 
III.i Gender construction unpicked – a necessary evil? 
Whilst individual offenders, such as the women in this sample, may benefit from being 
constructed as meeting idealized femininity, lenient treatment where this is based on gender 
constructions is criticized because the cost of mercy is the denial of her agency and the 
structural causes of her offending.88 First, whilst non-agentic explanations may help 
individual offenders to secure a more lenient disposal, it is said that this reinforces and 
perpetuates gender stereotypes in wider society, namely that all women are irrational, 
passive, vulnerable and weak.89 Linked to the issue of agency denial is the second problem 
with good/bad woman gender constructions, which is that they individualize criminality, 
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detracting from and indeed obscuring the structural causes of offending: criminal conduct is 
viewed as residing in the individual, in her weakness, irrationality, victimhood etc., not in the 
wider socio-political context which lead to that offending.90 As Ballinger has argued in the 
context of child murder in early twentieth-century England and Wales,  
 
“…leniency … came at a price, particularly when it was the end result of 
replacing agentic, rational explanations with pathological excuses for women’s 
actions, because such a strategy neutralized the perceived threat that these 
women posed to the social order. It therefore also minimized the opportunity for 
the development of an alternative truth. In particular, it undermined the 
structural causes of infanticide and child murder such as gross gender inequality 
and the wider social and economic circumstances which flowed from that 
inequality.”91 
 
In regard to the above, Ballinger highlights an important point, namely how punishment of 
female offenders which is based on gender constructions helps to maintain the 
heteropatriarchal social order.92 She argues that the key to understanding women’s 
punishment is “the state’s role in the production and reproduction of the gendered social 
order”.93 Specifically, gender constructions of women who kill “produce and reproduce the 
gendered subject”, reinforce gender differences in society, and individualize offending, which 
in combination serve to maintain heteropatriarchy: the gender social order is maintained and 
the structural causes of offending which lie in patriarchy are unchallenged.94 For example,                                                                                                                              
focusing on the treatment of women who killed their abusive husbands in England between 
1900 and 1965, she argues that the female and male gender constructions employed 
categorized these cases of women retaliating in the context of domestic violence as 
exceptional rather than as a consequence of the unequal power structure that the institution of 
marriage maintains between husbands and wives.95 The offender was constructed in such a 
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way as to highlight her “helplessness and victimhood”.96 Such constructions reinforced the 
inferior status of all women, presented the case as “extraordinary”, and stymied “long term 
structural changes for women as a category”.97 Related to this, the male victims were viewed 
as ‘“bad apples’ within a barrel of otherwise unproblematic masculinity”.98 Thus, the 
problematic patriarchal structures involved, namely the institution of marriage which 
traditionally enshrined male domination of women, remained unchallenged.99 Mercy 
stemming from such constructions was a “conservative strategy which sought to preserve the 
institution of marriage … and the existing gender order”.100  
 
Similarly, Ballinger argues that the legal response to women who killed their babies and 
young children in the early twentieth century,101 was closely connected to the maintenance of 
the gendered social order.102 Lenient treatment of these offenders, whilst well-intentioned, 
came at the expense of rational agentic explanations and so maintained gender stereotypes 
and undermined structural causes such as gender inequality. Again, this served the interests 
of heteropatriarchy because gender inequality, poverty, and the fact that the women in these 
cases had limited alternatives, remained hidden and therefore unchallenged.103  
 
Although analyses of punishment based on gender construction theories make an important 
contribution to understanding and critiquing sentencing of women offenders, I would like to 
suggest two limitations. First, whilst women’s agency may be denied in the courtroom, 
something which, theoretically, has been said to sustain and perpetuate wider gender norms 
by casting all women as irrational victims of circumstance or pathology,104 it is difficult to 
assess the significance of this in more practical terms. In other words, whether and to what 
extent legal constructions of women who kill make an appreciable contribution to the 
perpetuation of wider gender norms is questionable. Can we evidence the impact on society 
in general, and on non-criminal women and their lived experiences in particular? For 
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example, the infanticide law, on the face of it at least, constructs women who kill their babies 
as being mentally disturbed as a consequence of childbirth, and, therefore, according to 
feminist thinking, constructs all women, but especially new mothers, as being vulnerable to 
biologically produced mental disturbance. But does this legal construct augment or 
consolidate existing social constructions of all women? Are all women, but particularly those 
who give birth, viewed as (potentially) irrational non-agents? If this is the case, does 
infanticide law and practice add to this? And, if so, what impact does this have on woman, 
particularly those who are pregnant, parturient, or nursing, in terms of how they are 
understood, and, more importantly, then treated as citizens?  
 
Ultimately, the question is: if women are already viewed according to social gender norms as 
potentially irrational beings due to their biology, then what tangible impact does the law or 
courtroom practice have in helping to sustain such ideologies, and what are the concrete 
implications of this? It is unclear in these feminist gender-construction critiques, for example, 
how the use of stereotypical gender constructs in the courtroom in relation to criminal women 
make their way into wider societal discourse, and, if they do, what impact this has on how 
non-criminal women are viewed. For instance, even if the wider public were aware of how 
the law or the courts constructed women, through, for example, extensive media reporting, it 
is questionable whether this would have a noticeable impact on reinforcing stereotypes, 
particularly in light of women’s limited contribution to criminality as a whole and the fact 
that criminal women might well be viewed as being “different” to the rest of the population. 
In other others, whilst the way women in general are understood according to patriarchal 
norms may affect the way women offenders are perceived and treated, the way criminal 
women are understood may have little bearing on how the rest of the female population are 
understood. 
 
Carol Smart argues that “[t]he law can … be understood as a mode of reproduction of the 
existing patriarchal order…. [L]egislation does not create patriarchal relations but it does in a 
complex and often contradictory fashion reproduce the material and ideological conditions 
under which these conditions may survive’.105  However, the role of the criminal law, and 
particularly criminal sentencing, may be fairly limited in this regard. Whilst it can be said that 
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by employing stereotypical gender constructions the criminal justice system does “reproduce 
the gendered subject”,106 arguably helping to validate gender norms, it is questionable 
whether overall this makes an appreciable contribution to the perpetuation of such norms. 
There are other institutions which undoubtedly play a more important role in reinforcing and 
perpetuating gender stereotypes, such as schools, churches, the family, and other parts of the 
law which have a greater impact on women’s daily lived experiences (such as, for example, 
family law, health care law, and employment law).  In this light, if the criminal courts did not 
employ gender constructions it seems unlikely that the gender ideologies from which they are 
drawn would inevitably collapse or appreciably diminish in wider societal discourse.   
 
Further, as indicated by the quote from Smart in the previous paragraph, it may be important 
to draw a distinction between legal practice and the law as enshrined in legislation. In this 
regard, a question is raised about whether it is or ought to be the role of the criminal courts to 
challenge societal stereotypes. In particular, if gender stereotypes are pervasive in a society, 
can we expect judges and others involved in these cases to even recognize that they 
themselves are succumbing to such constructs in the way they assess the cases they encounter 
in the courtroom; if they are not conscious that they are relying on gender constructions, then 
how can we expect them to challenge them?  This is even more apposite where the law itself 
also embodies gender stereotypes, as in the case with the infanticide legislation, because in so 
doing the law has arguably legitimized that construct at least within the courtroom context; 
more importantly, it has formalized it as part of legal doctrine. Are the courts to then 
challenge both societal and legal norms in the way they practice justice? In this respect, it 
may be worth drawing a distinction between legal rules and criminal justice practice. The 
gender construction argument may have more potency in terms of critiquing legal doctrines 
which embody gendered understandings of women, first, because we might expect those who 
create law to avoid sexist stereotyping and to play a part in challenging inequality,107 and, 
second, because what “the law” as a body of rules and doctrines says may have a greater 
impact, than individual court decisions, on wider society.  
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Finally, if gender stereotypes help to ensure lenient treatment for offenders who do not 
deserve a harsh outcome because of the circumstances involved, do we want the courts to 
challenge those norms when the consequence of highlighting the offender’s rational agency is 
likely to be harsher punishment? If they do contest gendered understandings of criminality in 
this way, but also provide for lenient outcomes, it is difficult to see how such differential 
treatment could be justified.  This links into the second critique I would like to make of 
gender construction theory, which relates to the individualization of crime in wider criminal 
law theory and doctrine.  
 
Analyses of women’s punishment which critique the law for utilizing gender constructions 
that deny the structural causes of offending overlook the fact that the criminal law generally 
excludes the role of socio-political structural factors in criminal offending both in how it 
ascribes criminal liability and how it punishes; criminal behavior is individualized.108 Norrie 
has demonstrated how modern criminal law doctrine and punishment theory, informed by the 
Enlightenment concept of “liberal individualism”, is based on the idea of the “abstract 
juridical man”, a free, rational, calculating and responsible individual who is divorced from 
their social context.109 Thus, offenders are decontextualized and the wider social and political 
conflicts which affect the way a person reasons, behaves etc., are pushed aside.110 Even 
where the harshness of the law is mitigated through the use of insanity-type doctrines, such as 
the insanity defence, diminished responsibility, and infanticide, psychiatric discourse itself 
also “decontextualizes social agency … by locating the problem of insanity in the 
constitution of the individual”.111  
 
Thus, the criminal law “obscures social realities”112 and instead locates fault in the individual, 
whether by blaming their rational choice to break the law, or their irrational behavior 
stemming from individual pathology. What this demonstrates is that within the criminal law 
all individuals, male or female, are abstract constructs, and are never understood in terms of 
the social and political structures, such as gender, race and class inequality, that lead to 
criminal offending. The criminal law, therefore, emphasizes rationality and agency, basing 
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liability and punishment on the concept of free-will and choice. What gender construction 
theory highlights is that women criminals are interpreted in ways which emphasize their 
irrationality and lack of agency. However, whilst such discourses of female criminality may 
be criticized, it is important to recognize that decontextualization of offenders is not limited 
to women and is not solely a function of gender constructions, but of the law’s wider 
theoretical foundations. In other words, even if women offenders were viewed in non-
stereotyped terms, the law would still refuse to take account of the socio-political causes of 
offending. 
 
Those who use gender construction theory to critique punishment of women offenders seek 
rational agentic constructions of women’s criminality which acknowledge wider structural 
causes, but without an increase in punishment, although they do recognize the challenge 
inherent in this ambition.113 As the above demonstrates, in a context where the criminal law 
generally will not recognize socio-political mitigation, it is difficult to see how lenient 
treatment of someone such as the infanticide offender could result or be justified if the courts 
were to challenge gender stereotypes and recognize women’s rational agency.  Indeed, a 
denial of agency is what is arguably required under criminal law theory and doctrine to 
generate and defend lenient treatment. With regard to specific infanticide laws, for example, 
it has already been noted that the medical rational adopted was necessary for the purpose of 
legislating to allow for special lenient treatment of this offender without infringing the law’s 
requirement for individual responsibility.114 In other words, it would not have been possible 
to allow for social mitigation; pathologization of the infanticide offender was necessary in 
order to allow for a lenient disposal. As Norrie has noted, “[p]sychiatric discourse [i]s a 
convenient aid to rescue the law from the embarrassing consequences of its harsh narrowness 
while at the same time avoiding any focus upon the social conditions that gave rise to the 
crimes in question.”115  
 
In short, in a context where criminal liability is based on the notion of the rational, free and 
abstract individual who chooses to offend, and where the law cannot or will not openly 
countenance the role of social mitigation in attributing liability for and punishing any form of 
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criminal offending, constructions of an offender which serve to mitigate by denying agency 
and rationality are arguably a necessary evil in helping to foster and then justify differential 
lenient treatment. As it stands, it seems it is not possible or even realistic, in the context of 
wider criminal theory, to have both an acknowledgement of agency/rationality and mitigated 
punishment.116 In this regard, it is the entire criminal law which requires challenge to allow 
for all offenders, not only women, to be criminalized and punished according to their 
responsibility, which is assessed in such a way as to recognize his or her rationality in the 
context of wider socio-economic-political inequality.  
 
In summary, gender construction theories allow us to see how sentencing of the Irish 
infanticide offender reflected norms about gender: offenders were treated leniently because 
they were ultimately constructed as “good” women according to patriarchal norms. It has also 
been said that gender constructions help to maintain patriarchal interests by “producing and 
reproducing the gendered subject” (the irrational non-agentic woman), and denying the 
structural causes of offending. Some limitations to this approach have been noted, 
particularly the fact that the criminal law generally ignores the socio-political context of 
offending and that in this context gender constructions may have been a necessary evil to 
facilitate and justify lenient treatment of certain offenders. In the following section, the 
criminal justice response to infanticide is explored further drawing on the concept of 
paternalism. This also reveals how compassionate punishment of the infanticide offender 
served patriarchal interests, specifically by helping the state to retain control over women’s 
reproductive autonomy.  
 
IV. Paternalism, Patriarchy and Infanticide 
Another approach to explaining and critiquing punishment of women under the infanticide 
law is to look at the concept of paternalism. This also helps us to see the patriarchal nature of 
the criminal justice response to this offender. Moulds argues that legislative and court 
leniency towards women offenders is really paternalism.117 Paternalism (in the guise of 
mercy) may be beneficial to some offenders because it can result in lenient sentencing 
                                                 
116
 See Wilczynski, supra note 60 at 433 who makes a similar point.  
117Elizabeth F Moulds, Chivalry and Paternalism: Disparities of Treatment in the Criminal Justice System, 
31(3) Western Political Quarterly 416 (1978).   
Forthcoming  - to be published in the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism  
 
Released under CC-BY-NC 
disposals from a desire to “protect” her from a particular evil, such as imprisonment.118 
Paternalism, however, does not involve a straightforward exercise of compassion. Because it 
occurs in the context of an asymmetrical relationship, where the recipient of mercy is inferior 
to the benefactor, the apparent altruism exhibited may be double-edged.119 For example, 
Moulds argues that paternalism allows the “child” to be used to serve the interests of the 
“father”.120 Paternalism, therefore, is “more complex” than chivalry and “its practice is far 
more destructive in terms of psychological, social and political implications”.121 Davis also 
highlights the ambiguous nature of paternalism: whilst it involves elements of benevolence, it 
also involves the exercise of control, and, in fact, can result in more control over the inferior 
party to the relationship.122 In a sentencing context, this may mean, for example, that some 
women are subject to more invasive forms of punishment than what might otherwise be 
expected for the purposes of  “rehabilitation” or “protection”.123  
 
The approach to infanticide sentencing in this study demonstrates that individual offenders 
did not necessarily experience the negative consequences of paternalism. Admittedly, some 
women were sent to religious and medical institutions as part of their sentence, or were 
required to reside with parents or spouses. If, for example, the time spent at a “semi-penal” 
institution was longer than what a prison sentence would have been, and/or if the conditions 
of detainment were worse than that which pertained in prisons, particularly in terms of the 
level of surveillance and control she experienced, then arguably these women did experience 
more control as a consequence of benevolent inclinations that kept them out of prison.124 
However, in cases where women were not sent to semi-penal institutions it is difficult to 
identify any negative consequences of compassion. Instead, as will be argued in the 
remainder of this section, the adverse consequences of paternalism may have operated at a 
macro level, involving control over women in general rather than simply the offender at hand.  
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Compassionate treatment of the infanticide offender did two things if we consider the issue of 
control. First, as Norrie and Ballinger have noted, mercy, serves to uphold the authority and 
legitimacy of the criminal law;125 it supports the law’s validity as a mechanism of control. As 
explained in the previous section, the law will not admit to or engage with the socio-political 
conflicts that lead to crime, and so individualizes criminality.126 However, on occasion where 
the harsh stance the criminal law takes undermines its legitimacy, mercy functions to 
preserve its legitimacy.127 Rather than have the law’s authority to penalize those who break 
the law challenged on the grounds that it is unfair to criminalize/punish severely in light of 
the circumstances involved, mercy will be exercised. This is done, without acknowledging 
the wider structural factors involved, and for the purposes of preserving the law’s authority to 
criminalize and punish in that context by excluding socio-political conflicts from 
consideration.128 Lenience, therefore, is not solely a benevolent expression because ultimately 
it serves to maintain the authority and control of the criminal law. 
 
The history of infanticide provides an illustration of this. In the past, harsh criminal law (e.g. 
the mandatory death penalty) conflicted with public sentiment which resulted in the law 
being effectively ignored so that a compassionate response, as desired by the public will, 
would be provided.129 Thus, although the law and the public opinion were out of sync, 
criminal justice practice extended mercy to the offender and this helped to maintain the 
legitimacy of the law.130 However, because the law was routinely subverted by such ad hoc 
arrangements, this itself challenged the law’s legitimacy, and eventually lead to legislative 
reform to formalize lenience. Amongst the chief motivations for infanticide law reform were 
avoiding the “solemn mockery” of judges pronouncing death sentences that would never be 
carried out;131 the “tragic farce” of sending women for trial for an offence they would not be 
convicted of;132 and the abuse of other offences that were used to provide for a more 
compassionate conviction.133  Mercy, whether informal (by, for example, commuting death 
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sentences) or formal (as embodied in the law), therefore operated to uphold the law’s 
legitimacy in a situation where it was thought to operate harshly because there was sympathy 
for the offender in light of the circumstances in which her crime was committed, but where 
the law could not openly take account of the role of the socio-political factors involved.   
 
Second, compassion not only functioned to uphold the law’s legitimacy, authority and 
control, but it can also be said that it helped to uphold the legitimacy of the socio-political 
structures that lead to this crime in the first place because it showed that patriarchy had a 
“gentler” side. As outlined above, the crime of infanticide in Ireland during the middle 
decades of the twentieth century was deeply connected with patriarchal cultural and legal 
norms which prevented women from having control over their reproductive lives and 
castigated those who breached ideals of feminine virtue.134 In a similar way to how mercy 
functions to legitimize an otherwise unfair and harsh law, so too can it be said that it served 
to legitimize patriarchy because compassionate treatment of the infanticide offender made 
patriarchy appear less cruel and so less objectionable.  
 
The Irish state sought to deny women control over their reproductive lives, but one 
consequence of this was that some women concealed pregnancy and killed their babies. In 
other words, one of the extreme consequences of patriarchal control of women’s reproduction 
was infanticide. As the Irish experience of infanticide from the 1970s onwards clearly 
indicates, when women are given more reproductive choice, in terms of being able to prevent 
or end an unwanted pregnancy, or to be mothers to children outside of wedlock, infanticide as 
a crime declines significantly.135  However, to allow women to access contraception and 
abortion, or to allow them to be mothers to their illegitimate children by offering state support 
or making efforts to destigmatize unmarried motherhood gives them control over their 
reproductive destinies, and recognizes that women are autonomous beings who have a right 
to choose to be mothers or not, and in what circumstances. This is something that patriarchal 
cultures have always struggled with, and even with modern advancements, continue to 
grapple with.136 Certainly, in the 1950s and 1960s, when most of the cases in this sample 
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occurred, it was not something that prevailing patriarchal ideologies which centred on female 
virtue and the importance of the married family could permit. In this regard, it can be said 
that whilst patriarchy sought to retain control over all women’s reproductive lives, 
occasionally some women, such as those who committed infanticide, were “protected”, from 
the harshness of this system, and that this compassion helped patriarchy to maintain its grip. 
Protecting those few exceptional women who committed infanticide from the full extent of 
the criminal law did not grant any woman autonomy over her private life, and instead helped 
the state to retain control over all women’s reproductive freedom and choices. As feminist 
legal scholars have argued, the law is patriarchal in that it serves to maintain the interests of 
the dominant patriarchal gender order.137 Infanticide law and punishment is a good example 
of this.  
 
Related to the legitimating effect mercy had on patriarchy, lenient punishment arguably 
helped to divert attention from this crime and its causes, which also helped to maintain the 
patriarchal status quo. Arguably, if women who killed newborn babies had been imprisoned 
for lengthy terms, this would have drawn greater public attention to this crime, possibly 
generating debate about the circumstances in which it was committed and the wider structural 
factors that contributed to it, and leading to calls for legal and cultural reform. A search of the 
Irish newspaper database, which covers both national and local newspapers, for the period 
1950-1975, showed that most of the cases in this sample generated little or no media 
attention, particularly in cases involving the typical concealed birth. Evidently, infanticide 
was uncontroversial. However, if women had been given much harsher sentences, this might 
not have been the case.   For example, recent controversies which have highlighted the 
dangerous and cruel effects of strict abortion laws have helped direct attention to this issue, 
encourage public debate, and garner energy for reform.138 Although in the context of a more 
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liberal society, it does demonstrate that where public attention is drawn to the reality of the 
impact of harsh rules and laws, this will generate debate and will encourage reform. In this 
way, mercy allowed patriarchy to continue uninterrupted by the controversy that may have 
arisen if the worse effects of gender inequality, and women’s lack of reproductive autonomy, 
had been laid bare.  
 
So, mercy towards infanticide offenders helped patriarchy to retain its control over women’s 
reproductive autonomy because it both minimized the impact of the harshness of patriarchal 
values, laws and structures, and also diverted attention from the crime and its causes. This is 
not to suggest, however, that it was the role of the courts to challenge patriarchy or to argue 
that if they had done so they would have been successful, but merely to highlight the link 
between mercy and patriarchy. In essence, compassionate treatment of the infanticide 
offender operated as a patriarchal “pressure valve”. It allowed the state to continue to 
exercise control over women’s reproduction by showing the gentler side of patriarchy and 




Finally, the above analysis is not to suggest that judges or anyone else involved in lenient 
criminal justice practices, including those who enacted the infanticide law, were consciously 
seeking to preserve patriarchal ideology or that they did not feel genuine compassion for this 
offender. For example, documents consulted that related to the reform of the law on 
infanticide during the 1940s show that humanitarian sentiment played an important role in 
bringing about this legal change.139 However, as Smart notes, the law is not an instrument for 
the exercise of male power whereby male criminal justice actors seek to use the law for the 
benefit of men and against women’s interests.140 As Ballinger argues: “the state is patriarchal 
and the law is androcentric, but not in a simplistic, male inspired conspiratorial sense. Rather 
the state’s role in women’s oppression is subtle to the point where it appears to be gender 
neutral - or even protective towards women – by seemingly regulating the system to prevent 
further oppression”.141 The infanticide law and sentencing under it is a good example of how 
the law and legal practice can sometimes benefit women offenders in ways that exclude men 
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offenders from similar benevolent inclinations. Further, it demonstrates that genuine 
compassion for the offender from individual criminal justice agents and the preservation of 
patriarchal structures are not necessarily mutually exclusive; in fact, it highlights how 
genuine individual sentiment towards infanticide offenders functioned as a system to enable 
the state to preserve patriarchal norms and structures.   
 
6. Conclusion 
So where does this leave us in terms of explaining and critiquing punishment of women who 
killed their babies in Ireland in the 1950s and 1960s?  Both approaches explored above – 
gender construction and paternalism – highlight the link between punishment of women 
offenders, particularly for gendered crimes such as infanticide or the murder of an abusive 
husband, and the preservation of patriarchy, the very structure that contributed to these 
crimes in the first place. Gender construction theory critiques the way in which women 
offenders are understood as being irrational and weak, lacking in agency, and how this serves 
to deny the structural causes of offending, thus helping to maintain patriarchy. Paternalism 
highlights the link between compassion and control – the way mercy can function to serve 
patriarchy by showing that it has a benevolent side and by diverting attention from the 
inequalities at hand. Specifically, in the infanticide case paternalistic treatment of this 
offender allowed the state to retain control over women’s reproduction. Thus, in seeking to 
explain lenient treatment of infanticide offenders gender construction theory and paternalism 
both reveal that lenience was a part of patriarchy. It reflected patriarchal norms which viewed 
women as weak and irrational, and served patriarchal interests, particularly with regard to 
denying women reproductive autonomy. On the face of it, then, it might be said that lenient 
treatment was a bad thing for women because it helped to support patriarchy.  
 
Further, the fairness of prosecuting women for this crime in the first place might also be 
queried because when we consider the issue of where responsibility lay for these infants’ 
deaths it is evident that society and the state bore some of the fault. Ballinger argues that the 
notion that women who killed their babies in the early twentieth-century in England were 
treated leniently needs to the challenged. She states:  
 
“[t]he fact that all women who had killed their biological children were 
reprieved … did not and could not demonstrate ‘leniency’…. Instead we may 
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question the ‘harshness’ of punishment for this offence … thereby placing the 
burden of structural and socio-economic shortcomings and inadequacies on the 
shoulders of the very poorest and most powerless in society: individual women 
who were denied the necessary means to keep their children alive.”142  
 
In other words, despite the fact that cultural, social, economic and legal structural factors 
contributed to this crime,143 the infanticide offender was the sole focus of the criminal law. 
We should not, therefore, label the treatment of these women as “lenient” but instead 
challenge the fact that they were the target of the criminal law in the first place.  
 
In this regard, West has argued that patriarchy causes harm to women, especially in the 
context of sexuality and reproduction, with unwanted pregnancy being an instance of such 
“gendered harm”.144 The law/the state can play a part in reinforcing and perpetuating 
“gendered harms”.145 In the context at hand, patriarchal norms and values, which were 
embedded in various legal provisions and in the state’s approach to unmarried mothers, 
caused harm to women. Whilst it may be unduly facile to say that structural inequality 
automatically leads to offending, it is certainly evident that there was a causal link between 
the inequality this offender experienced, particularly with regard to her reproductive choices, 
and the crime of infanticide. Looking at infanticide from this perspective, it is possible to see 
that the harm caused to the baby by its mother was a consequence of the “gendered harm” 
caused to her by patriarchy, and the state’s adoption of patriarchal values in its laws and 
policies. It can be said, therefore, that the state did bear some responsibility for this crime. 
Arguably, by criminalizing women the state further compounded the harm caused to them by 
holding them solely responsible for the baby’s death.   
 
The recent discovery of the remains of 796 children aged between 2 days and 9 years old who 
had been buried at an unmarked mass grave between 1925 and 1961 at a mother and baby 
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home in Tuam, Co Galway reinforces this point.146 Although no evidence of suspicious death 
has so far been reported at the site following excavations,147 and there is no suggestion that 
any of these children died through violent means, legitimate questions can certainly be raised 
about whether systematic neglect played a part.148 As Fischer has noted more generally, 
“there is evidence of harsh, if not extremely abusive, treatment of those kept in religious 
institutions of ‘care’”.149 Given how little the state, the law, and wider society cared about the 
fate of illegitimate children,150 the pursuance of homicide charges against women who killed 
their babies at birth should be contested. It highlights the unfairness and hypocrisy of a 
system which blamed individual women for a crime that wider society had “antecedently 
much to answer for”.151 The impact of criminalization on individual women was, however, 
somewhat alleviated by the infanticide law and sentencing practice under it. In this regard, 
the authority of the criminal law to criminalize and punish in these circumstances, and to lay 
fault solely on the individual woman, and the patriarchal structures involved, were essentially 
legitimized by merciful treatment which allowed women to be convicted of a less serious 
homicide offence, and, essentially, avoid punishment. As Norrie has argued, the criminal law 
plays a political function in that it keeps social conflicts, particularly the class based 
inequality between rich and poor, and the fact that the criminal law is used primarily by the 
former against the latter, out of the courtroom.152 The infanticide law and sentencing under it 
certainly kept the conflicts created by patriarchy away from the courtroom, first through 
pathologizing this offender, blaming the crime on her individual vulnerability, and, second, 
through merciful treatment which served to further divert attention from her crime. Indeed, 
not only did the law and practice in these Irish infanticide cases serve to keep the conflicts of 
                                                 
146
 Garrett, supra note 26 at 709. For reporting on findings at this site following excavation, see 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/03/mass-grave-of-babies-and-children-found-at-tuam-orphanage-





 A commission of investigation was established by the Irish government in 2015 to investigate procedures and 
practices at Tuam and a number of other Mother and Baby homes, particularly in relation to deaths and burials: 
see http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/what-is-the-mother-and-baby-homes-commission-of-
investigation-1.2996729. Among the terms of reference for the Mother and Baby Homes Commission of 
Investigation (see http://www.mbhcoi.ie/MBH.nsf/page/index-en) is an examination of mortality among 
mothers and children at these institutions and to establish the causes, circumstances and rates of mortality; 
Commission of Investigation (Mother and Baby Homes and Certain Related Matters) Order 2015, Statutory 
Instrument number 57 of 2015, schedule (1)III.     
149
 Supra note 26 at 827. This comment is not restricted to mother and baby institutions but also to Magdalen 
asylums and industrial and reformatory schools.  
150
 See generally Moira J. Maguire, Precarious Childhood in Post Independent Ireland (2009). 
151
 As noted by Rev. Ld. S. G. Osborne when giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment in 1866. See Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, British Parliamentary Papers, 1866, vol. 
21, at 476.  
152
 Supra note 7 at 223-225.  
Forthcoming  - to be published in the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism  
 
Released under CC-BY-NC 
patriarchy out of the courtroom, and disguise the unfairness of targeting these women for 
criminalization, it also served to sustain unfair and unequal patriarchal structures outside of 
that context.  
 
The question that then arises is: what is the appropriate criminal justice response to 
infanticide? Given the circumstances involved, and, in particular, the role of patriarchy, 
should women who conceal their pregnancies and kill their babies at a secret birth not be 
subject to the criminal law? Or, should the circumstances involved serve to mitigate the 
crime, and, if so, what should this mitigation be based on – the reality of socio-political 
inequality, or a gender construction which masks the role of patriarchal values, laws and 
structures in the commission of this offence? The question of whether this offence should be 
subject to the criminal law is too complex to address here, so, I will limit my conclusions to 
the matter of mitigation.  
 
The analysis in sections III and IV above highlights that mercy can help to maintain 
patriarchy allowing the state to retain control over women’s reproduction, and, how a 
construction of the offender that reflects stereotypical views of women as being mentally 
unstable, may help to deny the structural causes of offending, which also serves patriarchal 
interests. In the end, the criminal justice response helps to preserve the patriarchal status quo. 
However, whilst mercy and gender constructions may be criticized because they help to 
support an unfair system, and in the case of the latter, also rely on demeaning stereotypes 
about women, we should not hasten to abandon such approaches. As already argued, gender 
constructions that deny the offender’s agency, whilst not ideal, are, when we take the wider 
context of the criminal law into account, an unfortunate necessity. Unless, we can challenge 
one of the core theoretical foundations of the criminal law, namely that the socio-political 
context of offending is irrelevant to ascribing criminal liability and punishing, it seems it 
would be impossible provide for lenient treatment without in some way highlighting the 
offender’s lack of agency. 
 
Further, taking the argument from the perspective of paternalism, although mercy towards the 
infanticide offender helps the state to retain control of all women’s reproduction, we wouldn’t 
necessarily want vulnerable women to suffer more punishment simply to provoke a challenge 
to patriarchal rules that deny women reproductive autonomy. Even if such a challenge were 
successful, the process of long term and significant change may be slow, and, in the 
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meantime individual women would suffer more punishment. Arguably, there are other ways 
to contest unfair social and political structures; this is not a job for the criminal courts.  It is 
important, therefore, to be pragmatic and realistic about what is achievable and how best to 
achieve this. In the context of infanticide, the desired goal is that women should have full 
reproductive autonomy. However, the way to realize this is not necessarily by punishing 
more severely those who kill their babies at a birth. Indeed, if such women are to be 
criminalized, the criminal justice system should not further add to the “gendered harm”153 
they have already experienced.  
 
In some respects, therefore, flawed as the approach may have been from a theoretical 
perspective, the infanticide law and the punishment regime that operated under it, was the 
best outcome for the cases in this sample. As already noted, although the infanticide statute 
labeled the crime as an act of “madness”, in practice, social circumstances were taken into 
consideration in the way the law was applied.154 The approach to infanticide held out the 
possibility of structural causes (such as cultural stigmatization of unmarried mothers, sexual 
double standards, poverty, lack of support, gender inequality, access to reproductive 
autonomy) being recognized. However, this was an imperfect process because whilst social 
mitigation may have been acknowledged this was arguably still focused on her individual 
circumstances (e.g. her sense of shame about becoming pregnant outside of marriage, the fact 
that the father had abandoned her), rather than on wider structural factors (e.g. stigmatization 
and sexual double standards). Further, she was still viewed through the lens of mental 
disturbance. Ultimately, the crime was never represented as a rational response to the 
personal and structural circumstances involved.  However, infanticide law and practice, 
which takes a sympathetic response to unmarried women who kill their babies at birth did, in 
a context where unmarried mothers were highly stigmatized, allow for an imperfect 
contextualization of her crime.  It may have been better to acknowledge more openly the 
wider structural factors, but at the end of the day the social context was not completely 
ignored. Given the fact that the criminal law does not take account of the wider social, 
economic, or political context of an offender’s crime in assessing their criminal guilt or in 
punishing, the approach taken to infanticide is perhaps the best that could be hoped for in 
terms of recognizing the mitigating factors in this crime. Ultimately, what the infanticide law, 
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and sentencing practice under it, allowed for was an imperfect contextualization of her crime, 
with minimal criminalization.  
 
 
 
 
